Zhong Han’s Critique of the New Qing History
Mon, 19 Sep 2022 06:21:51 +0200
An English book review on Zhong Han's book 清朝史的基本特徵再探究
Wong, Young-tsu (汪榮祖)
Journal of Chinese Humanities 7, no. 1–2 (9 December 2021): 201–11.
Zhong Han 鍾焓, Qingchaoshi de jiben tezheng zai tanjiu: Yi dui beimei xin Qingshi guandian de fansi wei zhongxin 清朝史的基本特徵再探究: 以對北美新清史觀點的反思為中心 [A New Look at the Fundamental Characteristics of the Qing Dynasty History: Focus on Rethinking the Views of the New Qing History School of North America]. Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 2018. 215 pages, ISBN: 978-7566015761.
The present volume under review is a judicious rebuttal of revisionism held by five American Qing scholars, namely, Pamela Crossley, Mark Elliot, Peter Perdue, Evelyn Rawski, and Edward Rhoads, whose works and arguments are generally attributed to the so-called “New Qing School” (referred to hereafter as NQS). As a young scholar whose expertise covers archaeology, history, and ethnic studies, Zhong Han 鍾焓 shows in this book an admirable ability in using Chinese, Manchu, and English sources to make his points.
In the Introduction, Zhong lays out the basic arguments made by the authors of NQS, and in the following four chapters he discusses, successively, the background from which NQS emerged, how the school constructed its historical issues, why the so-called “simultaneous emperorship” makes no sense, and how to respond to NQS with non-Han Chinese sources. At last, in the Conclusion, Zhong raises an ideological issue, addressing NQS’s apparent intermixture of scholarship and politics.
NQS, as Zhong puts it, looks at the Qing Dynasty [1616–1911] as if it were the owner of an apartment building, in which each unit is occupied by an individual ethnic group. The Han Chinese, but an occupant of one unit, is no more entitled than others. When the dynasty falls, the apartment owner having died, each unit would claim its share of ownership. This view suggests that the collapse of the Qing Empire is comparable to that of the Ottoman Empire, destined to anticipate the rise of various nationalistic states. Hence, NQS in effect regards the Republican China [1912–1949] following the fall of the Qing as something that proceeded the process of a “re-colonization” of different ethnic nationalities. Thus, NQS raises the ultimate question: was either the Republic of China or the People’s Republic of China ever entitled to inherit the territory of the moribund dynasty? For Zhong, it is utterly groundless to regard the Qing Dynasty as a Western-style colonial empire, let alone seeing Han China as a colony of the Qing.
As is well-known, NQS objects to the long-standing concept of “Sinification” [hanhua 漢化], which means the process of becoming Han Chinese. It unfairly denounces those who uphold Sinification as ethnocentric Han chauvinism. But Sinification is not merely a concept but a fact accompli throughout the long history of China. Long before the Qing, various minorities on the frontier, once entering into China proper, were already Sinicized by absorbing Han culture and adopting the unique Chinese written language. Zhong cites Western observers living in Qing China, in the 18th and 19th centuries, to confirm the reality of Sinification. For instance, an eighteenth-century Jesuit priest Dominique Parrenin 巴多明 [1663-1741] in his letter to home in Paris, remarked that the Manchus had changed nothing in Chinese culture except for the apparel and head-shaving. (p. 6) Nor did Dominique Parrenin fail to notice that the Manchus he met all spoke Han Chinese. A century later, a European missionary Régis-Evariste Huc 古伯察 [1813-1860] reported the same experience in China, as he noted that the Sinicization phenomenon could be seen clearly, from China proper to Manchuria. (p. 6) In fact, according to field research conducted in the late nineteenth century, the Manchu inhabitants in Beijing and Liaodong were fully Sinicized; in central Manchuria, partially Sinicized; and only in the remote northern Manchuria was the Han influence perceived to be not as palpable. (p. 6) In this way, Zhong reminds us that the Mongols, the Tibetans, and the Uighurs all identified themselves with Qing China without differentiating between the Han and the Manchus.
NQS venerates the importance of using Manchu archival sources. Examining the four representative works of NQS, namely, Crossley’s A Translucent Mirror, Rawski’s The Last Emperor, Rhoads’ Manchu and Han, and Elliot’s The Manchu Way, Zhong finds them all very disappointing for their scarce and clumsy use of Manchu sources. Rawski, in her bibliography, cites no Manchu archives at all, with her text mainly based on Han language materials from the Chinese First Historical Archive in Beijing. She makes almost no use of the Manchu materials that were not available in translation. Rhoads shows little, if any, interest in the Manchu materials, perhaps due to the subject of his study, which exclusively deals with the late Qing period. In Zhong’s view, several journals and newspapers in Manchu language printed before and after the 1911 Revolution, which would undoubtedly have helped understand the Manchu mentality in the climate of the anti-Manchu revolution, are entirely neglected by Roads. How unfortunate!
Crossley, as she herself claims, has used the “Manchu Archive” [Manwen laodang 滿文老檔] and the “Old Manchu Archive” [Jiu Manchou dang 舊滿洲檔], which recorded the Manchu past before moving into China Proper. (p. 31) While the latter was not made available until the 1960s, the former was opened to the public early in the 1930s, both being essential sources for Qing specialists in China and Japan. While using these Manchu language materials, Crossley cannot make useful comments or necessary corrections to either Han or Japanese translations of the said documents. She draws extremely little out of the newly available Manchu sources. Hence Zhong has reason to doubt, as he should, if Crossley even possesses a sufficient reading knowledge of the Manchu language materials. Elliot uses Manchu sources more widely than the rest. Unlike Crossley, he references Kangxi 康熙 [1661–1722], Yongzheng 雍正 [1723–1735], and Qianlong’s 乾隆 [1736–1795] Manchu remarks on memorials submitted by officials. However, the Chinese translation of all the Manchu memorials of the three emperors was published in the 1990s. Elliot distrusts the Han language rendering, even though scholars widely recognize the accuracy of the translation.1
Moreover, for Zhong, the Manchu materials Elliot cites often appear to be casual and incomplete. (pp. 32–33) Elliot should have used his Manchu language skill to correct, amend, and criticize the translations which he mistrusts, yet he did not do so. Thus in Zhong’s opinion, the NQS scholars, though having pronounced the importance of using non-Han sources, did not make any break throughs or more significant contributions than the old-fashion Qing historians. (pp. 37–38) The undeniable fact is that Qing scholars, whether old or new, could not but mainly depend upon the most substantial quantities of the Han Chinese source materials.
Zhong makes considerable efforts in examining Crossley’s arguments. Unfortunately, he finds her inclined to anchor her theses to misreadings and erroneous assumptions, which render her conclusions groundless. (p. 48) Whatever language one uses, they must not misread it; yet Zhong finds in Crossley’s work a string of gross misinterpretations of the sources. For instance, she misidentifies Tong Dali 佟達禮, whom she says was “clearly one of the Jerched (Jürčed) from the Sanwanwei 三萬衛 who the Ming government permitted to settle in Liaodong.” (p. 54) Here she mistakes Sanwanhu 三萬戶 (30,000 Jerchen households) for Sanwanwei (30,000 Ming guardsmen). Tong Dali, far from being a newly settled Jürčed in Liaodong, was a fully Sinicized Jürčed in the early Ming [1368–1644], who served as a military officer to chase the retreating Mongol remnants, and then helped to pacify the native Jürčed in Manchuria.2 More surprisingly, without substantial evidence, she claims that Tong was related to the Manchu royal family by remote kinship. (p. 54) In fact, according to the highly respected modern historian Zheng Tianting 鄭天挺 [1899–1981], the Ming court was fully convinced that the Tongs who had lived in Liaodong for generations were Han Chinese by origin.3
Liaodong had been a land of cohabitation by the Hans and the Jürčeds for centuries. Under the influence of the Han culture, the Jürčeds were Sinicized. No matter how many of them might have become Sinicized, known as Nikan, who joined the Han army in the Eight Banners; the Tongs, even if they had Jerchen (Jurchen) origin, were Han in a cultural sense. Significantly, Liaodong inevitably emerged as a Sinicized society, and yet Crossley is unwillingly to see it as it was. Instead, she prefers the terms “urbanization” or “tribalization” to “Sinification,” disregarding the fact that the Manchu social institution was a clan-based “hala mukūn,” not at all tribal or urban. (p. 59)
More absurdly, Crossley cites the Tongs’ request to restore their Manchu ancestry during the Kangxi reign to argue that the Qing court started the transforming itself from cultural identity to ethnical identity, and the process of ethnicity was completed in the late Qing China. (p. 60) However, as Crossley tries painstakingly to establish, the conscious formation of Manchu ethnicity does not hold water. The Tong request was an individual case, which only two Tong families made.4 Though granted, it never really achieved the intended elevation for the Tongs from Hanjun 漢軍, or Han Militia, to one of the Manchu Eight Banners. The two families were only upgraded to a higher banner within the Hanjun.5 Hence, her theory of ethnicity identity, as Zhong puts it, appears “to chase the wind and clutch at shadows.” (p. 57)
Crossley’s reading knowledge of Chinese written language is supposed to be better than that of her command of the Manchu language. But to Zhong’s great surprise, Crossley cannot comprehend some elementary Chinese words and sentences correctly. For instance, in her article, “Manzhou yuanliu kao and the Formalization of the Manchu Heritage,” she misreads “the Changbai mountain and the Amur River” [baishan heishui 白山黑水], which refers to Manchuria, thus being wrongly translated as “Changbaishan 長白山 in the region of Amur.” (p. 86) She appears to be unaware that the mountain is geographically far away from the river to the north. Equally surprising for Zhong is to see another sample of her translation: “The Jin annals for the Moho peoples of the Tang period include more than ten biographies of Bohai kings, who for generations have literary scripts and rituals.” (p. 71) Here she mistakes the verb “chuan” 傳 [pass on] for the noun “zhuan” [biography], so she has altered the original text, which should have read “the Bohai kings, after ten generations, came up with literary script and rituals.” Her misunderstanding now generates grave errors: for “the Bohai kings acquired script and rituals before the Jurchens of the Jin dynasty,” she reads as “the Bohai kings were the ancestors of the Jurchens.” (p. 71) Here she misreads “in advance” [xian 先] as “forefathers”. It seems that her preoccupation with establishing a Bohai-Jurchen-Manchu genealogy had misled her. She also arbitrarily translates Emperor Qianlong’s edict as “the dynasty has accomplished all the tasks and assumed all the symbols of a legitimate empire.” What the Emperor said was that “The dynasty, having made Beijing as capital and accomplished the unification of China, rules the country so impressively and legitimately that no previous dynasties could be on par with it.” (p. 72) We cannot but wonder if any accurate interpretation could come out of misreading.
Bias easily results in anachronism. Crossley unhesitatingly assumes that Nurhaci and the Ming emperors were heads of two independent states. The fact is that Nurhaci consciously subordinated his Jianzhou 建州 to the Ming Dynasty in the south, even though later Qing scripts tend to conceal the truth.6 The statement “my [Nurhaci] forefathers, who had been loyal and obedient to help guarded the frontier on behalf of the Southern Dynasty [the Ming]” was deleted from the later-compiled “Taizu shilu” 太祖實錄 [The Authentic Records of Taizu Emperor]. Historians should certainly use sources closer to the events, and yet Crossley would instead use later sources, and obviously more fabricated sources, in order to establish her thesis that Nurhaci had already founded a sovereign state in Northeast Asia.
Zhong finds it hard to understand that Crossley, having claimed to have studied Manzhou yuanliu kao 滿洲源流考 [A Study of the Manchu Origin] authorized by Emperor Qianlong, cannot find any indication which says Manchuria or the West Region was not a part of China. Qianlong never identified himself as the ruler based on an East Asian entity to inherit the Liao [907–1125]-Jin [1115–1234] political transition. Instead he made it amply clear that he was the ruler of China to inherit an imperial line from the Song [960–1279] and Yuan [1206–1368], thus he was an unquestionable, legitimate successor to “the rulers of China” [Zhonghua zhi zhu 中華之主]. Zhong is certainly right, as Qianlong, in a preface to The Royal Annotated General History of China [Yupi lidai tongjian jilan 御批歷代通鑒輯覽], wrote un-mistakenly that “this work begins from the very ancient time to our dynasty, a history of 4,559 years.”7 That is the history of China, which includes, not excludes, the Qing dynasty, though NQH tries to argue otherwise. Thus, the so-called “Northeast regionalist sentiment,” as Crossley puts it, appears grossly exaggerated.
That Qianlong “excluded the Hanjun from banners” and made them commoners had nothing to do with ethnic identity. Instead, the action was, first of all, to tighten up control of all the Banners in the wake of continuous imperial centralization from the Yongzheng Reign onward, and secondly, above all, to resolve the problem of the increasing poverty of the Manchu bannermen. Crossley erroneously calls the Hanjun “turncoat officials” [erchen 貳臣]. As Zhong points out, more than half of the turncoat officials were not at all Hanjun bannermen, and none of the Hanjun bannermen later being designated by the Qianlong Emperor as turncoat officials, was Nikan, or the Han Chinese who earlier submitted themselves to the Manchu authorities. (pp. 122–123) They never served in the Ming government, so there was no question of being turncoat officials. Here Crossley makes a mistake saying that various Han Chinese, such as the Nikans, in the Banners belonged to Hanjun.
“Simultaneous emperorship,” after having been conceptualized by Crossley and the like, becomes a key concept of NQH, which in plain language means the Qing ruler has a “split personality.” (p. 130) The ruler played a different role for different ethnic groups: he was an Emperor, or Son of Heaven, for the Han Chinese; Clan Leader for the Manchu Bannermen; Qayan for the Mongol Princes. This so-called “rule of combination,” previously expounded by the Japanese scholar H. Okada, as Zhong indicates, is rejected by the Mongolian expert C. P. Atwood. (p. 130) Zhong makes a lengthy rebuttal by supplying numerous literary sources to support Atwood. (pp. 131–134) Briefly, the Qing ruler first and foremost identified himself with “Emperor” (Son of Heaven, or Huangdi 皇帝) simply because he intended to be a universal ruler of China, assuming the legitimacy of the Mandate of Heaven. Prior to his entrance into the Pass, Huang Taiji 皇太極 [r. 1636–1643] in 1636 assumed “emperorship” in the Chinese tradition, and the word had already been rendered into the Manchu language as “hūwangdi” in 1629 as it appeared in the Manchu archive. The honorable title for the late Nurhaci had also been changed from “nenehe han” to “taidzu xôwangdi.” Even though Huang Taiji did not use “xôwangdi” exclusively, there is no doubt that after entering into the Pass, his successor Shunzhi 順治 [1644–1661] made “Emperor” his supreme and sole title. The Shunzhi Emperor, who replaced the Ming dynasty with the Qing, became to be a highly Sinicized ruler. What is the evidence of it? This reviewer incidentally located the Essentials of Imperial Governing [Yuzhi zizheng yaolan 禦制資政要覽] issued by the Shunzhi emperor, in which he unmistakably declared in preface that “I, the emperor, will run the imperial institution only”, and the contents of the book are filled with Confucian values.8 It states explicitly that “the cardinal principle of righteousness runs through every chapter [of the book]. I use this work to exemplify the deeds of faithful officials, filial sons, virtuous men, and incorruptible clerks.”9 The Emperor meant what he said, as shown in the distribution of a large number of copies to his bureaucrats high to low, with the top echelons receiving the exquisite “butterfly-style” edition.10
Emperor Kangxi unquestionably identified himself as the Chinese ruler of China. In the text of 1689 Nerchinsk Treaty with Russia, the Qing ruler signed as “dulimbai gurun-i enduringge xôwangdi” in Manchu language, and “Zhongguo dasheng huangdi” 中國大聖皇帝 [the Great Sage Emperor of China] in Han language. The Russians as well regarded Qing as China. Kangxi as the Emperor of China can also be seen in his four available posthumous decrees. As Gan Dexing 甘德星 indicates, posthumous decrees were the key documents for power transition; in them, Kangxi addressed himself as “the Chinese Emperor,” explicitly declaring that he was the ruler of China and the ruled were all Chinese.11 Moreover, Kangxi deliberately placed the Qing dynasty in the genealogy of Chinese dynastic history. Hence there is no doubt that the Qing was China, and the homeland was China Proper rather than Inner Asia. Kangxi believed he was the Chinese ruler of China, and so did Yongzheng, Qianlong, and the rest. The effort to separate the Qing dynasty from China was fruitless, and the idea of “simultaneous emperorship” is not tenable.
Instead of simultaneous emperorship, “simultaneous languages,” principally Man and Han, were expressed in the Manchu language as “bithe i emu obure dasan.” (p. 153) In the different languages, simultaneously carried out though were the same messages and values. During the Qianlong reign, when the Qing regime flourished by incorporating Inner Asia, simultaneous languages became a symbol of political universality and pluralism in ethnic cultures. It helped to claim the Qing’s inheritance to all under Heaven, corresponding to the political belief of traditional Chinese monarchism. Nevertheless, the Han language remained the principal, as Zhong demonstrates: the face of a Qing coin bears the inscription “the universal treasure of the Qianlong reign” [Qianlong tongbao 乾隆通寶], in Han language. (p. 154) The Manchu and other ethnic languages appear on the opposite side of the coin. The Qing rulers, for the sake of enhancing their imperial power, emphasized Man-Han unity and promoted universal kingship in traditional Chinese fashion. They certainly would like to be addressed as the emperor of China rather than far less prestigious title of the “feudal lord” supervising different ethnicities.
NQH denies that the Qing dynasty was analogous to China, and denounces such a claim as modern Chinese chauvinism. Distasted of such accusations, Zhong employs much evidence to make his points, using not the Han language literature but Manchu, Mongolian, and Tibetan sources. (pp. 161–172) There is no question that the Qing dynasty identified itself as China.
The word “China” in Manchu language first appeared before the Qing settled in Beijing in 1644 to refer to the Ming dynasty in the south; however, afterward, it was used to signify the Qing. As Zhong mentions, during the transition period from the Ming to the Qing, the Portuguese priest G. de Magalhães [1609–1677] reported from Beijing that the Manchus, by the time of Kangxi, had already considered China, or dulimba-i gürün, identical to the Great Qing, or daicing gurun in Manchu language. (p. 162) The Manchu official Tulichen 圖理琛 [1667–1740], whom the Kangxi emperor dispatched to deal with his Russian counterpart, used such language as “we China” (meni dulimba-i gurun), or “in our China” (meni dulimba-i gurun de). (p. 163) China in Manchu language appeared 23 times in Tulichen’s journal entitled Yiyulu 異域錄 [Journey to the Foreign Land]. Zhong regrets that Crossley still erroneously reads “meni dulimba-i gurun,” seen frequently in Tulichen’s journal, as “China subordinating to us” (p. 171) She has either deliberately misinterpreted it or failed to understand this Manchu term. An accurate reading suggests that Manchu officials in the seventeenth century had already consciously recognized themselves as the Chinese empire’s government servants..
It was not just the Manchus who considered the Qing dynasty as China. As Zhong demonstrates, so did the Mongols. The Mongolian term for China “dumdadu ulus” was not a creation of the post-Qing era; instead, it appeared in a Mongolian-Russian dictionary published in 1849. Even much earlier, the term arose in the 1727 Treaty of Kiakhta, in which the Qing court settled the Mongolian border with Russia. Looking into the hitherto ignored Mongolian text of the Treaty, the German specialist Michael Weiers finds that the term for China appeared in the Mongolian version as well.12 It directly borrowed the Manchu term dulimba-i gurun, meaning China. Most importantly, Mongolia was described as a part of China, such as “the Mongolian Kalun of China” (dumdadu gürǖn-ü mongγol qaraγul), which showed that the Qing government considered itself to be China. Zhong cites numerous examples from Manchurian, Mongolian, and Tibetan languages to sustain his argument that the Qing regime, besides equating itself with China, also required Mongolia, Xinjiang 新疆, and Tibet to acknowledge its suzerainty over China.
NQH’s eagerness to exorcise China from the Qing regime, to Zhong’s dismay, has an undeniable political motivation. Historians such as Pamela K. Crossley and Peter C. Perdue have blatantly challenged the legitimacy of the internationally recognized boundary of modern China. Suppose the Qing is indeed being likened to a colonial power, the interpretation of its collapse gives rise to a new discourse: its minorities could have each had the right to establish an independent state, as those post-WWII former Western colonies did. But imperial China, historically unlike capitalism-based imperial power, had a four-thousand-year unique tradition, and Emperor Qianlong stated straightforwardly that his dynasty was in line with that long tradition. Thus the power transition from Qing China to Republican China is indisputable. Moreover, it seems incomprehensible that China could not be a multi-ethnic nation like most nations in the world, including the United States of America.
Professor Zhong Han has written a very important book. It covers a wide range of issues raised by NQH, and effectively challenges all their key arguments and assumptions. The author reminds us that we should not uncritically accept the revisionism of NQH. Understandably, given its highly specialized nature, the first edition of this book has issued only few hundred copies for limited circulation. This book should be reprinted in a large quantity to benefit the reading public. The author needs only to revise editing and to eliminate misprints, since the contents are sound.
 Sheng Yun 盛韻, “Ou Lide tan manwen yu manzu rentong 歐立德談滿文與滿族認同 [Elliot On Manchu and Manchu Identity],” in Shufang weiyuan: Gudai Zhongguo de jiangyu minzu yu rentong 殊方未遠：古代中國的疆域、民族與認同 [The Territory, Nationality, and Identity of Ancient China], ed. Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光 et al. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2016), 378–79.
 See “Tongshi jiapu 佟氏家譜,” appendix to Youfenlu 幽憤錄, from Qingchaoshi de jiben tezheng zai tanjiu: Yi dui beimei xin Qingshi guandian de fansi wei zhongxin 清朝史的基本特徵再探究: 以對北美新清史觀點的反思為中心 [A New Look at the Fundamental Characteristics of the Qing Dynasty History: Focus on Rethinking the Views of the New Qing History School of North America] (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 2018), 5.
 See Zheng Tianting 鄭天挺, “Qingdai huangshi zhi shizu yu xuexi 清代皇室之氏族與血系 [Clans and Bloodlines of the Royal Family in Qing Dynasty],” in Qingshi tanwei 清史探微 [A Probe into Qing History], ed. Zheng Tianting (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999), 25–26.
 See Zheng Tianting, “Qingdai huangshi zhi shizu yu xuexi,” 27–28.
 See Hou Shouchang 侯壽昌, “Liaodong Tongshi zushu qiji kaobian 遼東佟氏族屬旗籍 考辨 [Research on the Clan of Tong Clan in Eastern Liaoning],” in Ming-Qing dang’an yu lishi yanjiu 明清檔案與歷史研究 [Ming and Qing Archives and Historical Research] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988), 367–69. For a more recent study of the Tong clan see Yang Haiying 楊海英, “Ming-Qing zhiji Liaodong Tongshi xianshi kaobian 明清之際遼東佟氏先世 考辨 [A Study in the Tong Ancestry during the Transition Period from the Ming to the Qing], in Minzu yanjiu 民族研究 [Ethnic Studies] (2019),No. 6,pp. 95–108.
 See Meng Sen 孟森, “Qing Taizu zhi gaotian qidahen zhi zhenben yanjiu 清太祖之告天七大恨之真本研究 [A Study on the True Origins of the Seven Hate of Qing Taizu],” Shixue 史學, no. 1 (1935).
 Yupi lidai tongjian jilan 御批歷代通鑒輯覽 [The Royal Annotated General History of China], Taipei xinxing shuju yingyin sibu jiyao ban 臺北新興書局影印四部集要版, 1959, 1:3.
 See Yuzhi zizheng yaolan 御製資政要覽 (Yangzhou: Guangling shushe 2016).
 See Preface to Yuzhi zizheng yaolan, 1a–5b.
 Professor Xin Deyong 辛德勇 of Peking University possesses various versions of this work, and I must thank him for showing them to me.
 Gan Dexing 甘德星, “Kangxi yizhao zhong suojian daQing Huangdi de Zhongguo guan 康熙遺詔中所見大清皇帝的中國觀 [The Qing Emperor’s View on China in the Posthumous Edict of Kangxi],” in Qing diguo xingzhi de zaishangque: Huiying xinqingshi 清帝國性質的再商榷：回應新清史 [Reconsideration on the Nature of the Qing Empire: A Response to the New Qing History], ed. Wong Young-tsu 汪榮祖 (Taoyuan: Guoli zhongyang daxue chuban zhongxin, 2014), 110–11.
 See M. Weiers, “Der Russisch-Chinesische Vertag von Burinsk von Jahre 1727: Zur mandschurischen und den mongolischen Textfassungen des Sbornik,” in Florilegia Manjurica: In Memoriam Walter Fuchs, ed. M. Weiers et al. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1982), 199–203.
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